Amid the fanfare and probing questions, U.S. officials must remember that Hu still has far to go to consolidate his position. At best, the uncertainties of leadership politics will make Hu a somewhat uncertain negotiating partner for some time to come. At worst, he may find himself nominally in charge of a leadership paralyzed by mounting crises–rising unemployment, for one–and a vague power structure.
Hu’s short-term politics will be defined not so much by his own hidden policy views as by his need to survive politically–“the successors’ dilemma.” While Jiang Zemin retains his political power, Hu must struggle to keep Jiang’s trust and support. But to secure his status after Jiang is gone, Hu must simultaneously promote his own supporters within the party and the Army. It’s a high-wire act: If Hu builds his own power base too aggressively, he risks alienating Jiang. If he is too passive, then he could have few allies when tough policy decisions arise in the future. Thus far, Hu’s efforts to forge an independent base can only be rated a moderate success. Hu has scoured the countryside seeking promising young officials to promote, and older officials with long career ties to Hu have sprung up in significant posts. Many more will likely emerge at this fall’s party congress. Still, their numbers are hardly overwhelming, and it may be some months or years before Hu is secure enough to press for major policy changes.
In the cloaked world of Chinese politics, it is not entirely clear yet how Jiang feels about Hu. On the positive side, Jiang has entrusted Hu with increasingly sensitive, high-profile tasks–investigating corruption by high-level officials (some with ties to Jiang), and reigning in Army and police business activities. Most dramatically, Jiang left Hu in charge when he took a prescheduled trip to Latin America at the height of last year’s reconaissance-plane crisis with the United States. Hu’s reception by President Bush marks the first time since 1985 that a top Chinese leader has risked being upstaged in the world media by allowing a prospective successor to visit Washington.
But unquestionably, Jiang’s support has been uneven. The accepted wisdom in Beijing is that Hu is not Jiang’s favorite. For over two years Jiang has reportedly tried–thus far without success–to secure a seat on the ruling Politburo Standing Committee for his longtime right-hand man, Zeng Qinghong. Jiang also seems to have dragged his feet helping Hu build support at the top of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)–the ultimate guarantor of any top Communist Party leader. Although Hu is expected to succeed Jiang as party general secretary this fall, and state president next spring, Jiang appears likely to emulate Deng Xiaoping by retaining the chairmanship of the party’s Military Commission, from which he could continue dominating security and foreign affairs. So long as Jiang retains the military leadership, Hu Jintao will always feel someone looking over his shoulder.
Under such conditions, will Hu feel secure enough to promote the risky reforms China needs? The party is being buffetted by threats to its control, including an eroding law-enforcement system and a more than 300 percent rise in mass demonstrations from 1993 to 1999. As leader, however, Hu must take tough decisions; he can no longer just echo Jiang’s platitudes. Add to this chronic tensions with the United States and a Taiwan leadership seemingly bent on testing Beijing’s limits. On U.S.-Taiwan issues, Hu must take care lest he upset Jiang and a military leadership on whom he has yet to place his own stamp. At times, voicing his tougher, nationalist side may be Hu’s safest default position. The United States must be prepared for the impact of such personal tensions. Hu’s policy decisions will redefine him and his agenda in ways that may surprise or upset Jiang–possibly even tempting one to try forcing the other out. To outsiders, China’s succession game will be most intriguing. But for Hu, it won’t be fun to play.
